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The Future of Peace and Stability Operations  

Notes:

Mr. Smith provided some background facts explaining that much of what he had to say to the Rethinking audience would relate specifically to Africa but was generally applicable to all peace and stability operations.

- 10 of 20 UN peacekeeping operations are currently going on in Africa
- 75% of all UN peacekeepers are deployed in Africa
- At one time two-thirds of peacekeepers in Africa were non-African
- Because of the response to the Sudan crisis, less than 50% of peacekeepers are non-African
- Both the number of missions and the number of people involved have been increasing in recent years
  - In 1984 about 12,000 were deployed and many were not armed
  - By 2001 there were 41,000 deployed in more complex missions
  - Today there are 120,000 deployed and most are armed

Missions today are multi-dimensional so there is a need for a greater number of people
- Originally peacekeepers only were needed to stand between two hostile sides
- Now there is much nation-building going on to develop rule of law, plus police and court systems
- Since the Cold War ended, the focus has shifted to more intra-state situations

Projections indicate that peacekeeping ops will like stay about the same number or increase in years to come
- Studies (see Paul Collier, Oxford) have shown that in the 20th century if peacekeeping ops are scaled back too soon, then the area in question will be back in hostilities within five years
  - While 6 months used to be the target for such operations, now there is an effort to stay much longer
- The UN’s budget for all of these efforts is about $6.6B which is less than that of the New York Police Dept.
  - The Congressional Research Service has studied it and deemed it cost effective

A single slide sums up the current concept of peacekeeping or the GPOI Vision.
- To maintain good peacekeeping ops, there is a need to walk the road in a certain way
- The operation must be led by a civilian presence who has both civil police and military support
- Remedial action can be planned based on previous situations
- A good operation builds on the foundation of existing organizations like the African Union or NATO
  - Such groups would be considered Partners in the operation
  - Contributors might be countries or other entities that offer funding or technical expertise
- There must also be an established doctrine
- What is being done must be institutionalized to keep it going
- Lessons learned are identified for use in future similar operations
Peacekeepers

- Usually there are not enough peacekeepers
- Other problems exist largely because the US or other major western nations are not directly involved
  - Only about 300 of the 120,000 are Americans
  - Because operations always face a dearth of capable peacekeepers, it is necessary to make up the difference using masses of troops
  - Basic required equipment is also lacking
    - In Darfur the problem is a lack of lift and tactical (attack) helicopters
    - In past events Ukrainians or some others would usually be contracted to come in helos or other specialized equipment, but no one wants to get involved in Darfur
  - Similar problems existed with operations in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire which improved when the French became involved
- Greatest needs: aviation assets, logistics assets, technical mobility (APC) assets

A large element of peacekeepers should be “Formed Police Units” – armed police forces who can act en masse much as a military force could do

- To be used for crowd control or riot police
- FPUs, the stability police units, require special training
  - Italy has established a Center of Excellence to train such troops
  - 160 trainers are involved in training groups from various countries
  - While thousands have been trained, there is no way of tracking them to see which ones have been involved in subsequent operations or how well they did

The Brahimi Report of 2000 (http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations) was written to address the failures of peacekeeping in Sierra Leone and the Balkans

- Provided many major findings and identified the most pressing needs
- There have been improvements since the report
The next major player in peacekeeping will be the African Union

- It has had a Peace & Security Protocol for three years now based on in-depth thinking about how to employ and sustain peacekeeping troops
- The way to deploy troops usually involves asking the US or NATO for help
- Much depends on which countries will be the Contributors – very frequently the US or France

Legal aspects of peacekeeping

- Some early efforts by the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) showed the need for rules of law
  - In one instance a Nigerian-led peacekeeping operation was accused of corruptions
- Now the Africans are building and using a peace and stability architecture
  - They have a “panel of the wise” among other things to help them
  - Even with an architecture there is a need for strong leaders who cannot be influenced by people like Qadfi as has happened in the past

One problem is that a peacekeeping operation may have several agendas at work at any one time

- Darfur is currently the most important event
- The UN must constantly adjust to these new situations but may find it difficult to do so
- The UN / African Union operation in Darfur involved having two leaders
  - This hybrid organization reduced effectiveness even when clearly spelled-out agreements existed
- Somalia and the Solomon Islands could become the next areas needing peacekeepers
  - There is more effort at being flexible and adaptable

Management of peacekeeping ops is greatly needed and there is never enough to do the job effectively

- Peace Operations 2010 will involve internal reforms and restructuring including:
  - More / better trained people – especially in the African Union countries
  - 25-30 tried to give them millions of dollars but they could not manage to handle such transactions
  - Problems start with limited or no communications methods – no one returns calls to the Contributors
  - Staff people were unable to absorb what the Contributors wanted to give and could not even identify their requirements
- Now that South Africa holds the Presidency of the UN Security Council there is some hope for progress
  - There is a desire to obtain funding from the UN or sources other than the US
  - Both the US and EU tend to want too much accounting of where their money is going
- There is also a great need to improve communications between the Contributors and the troops on the ground

Political Will

Peacekeeping requires mandates from the Contributing countries

- Should involve getting many different opinions to help determine what the mandate should be
- There is now a military planning service within the UN
  - It helps determine if rules of engagement are adequately robust
  - Rules on using deadly force in 1994 were so bad that the peacekeepers were made completely ineffective
  - That lesson was learned and now the mandates can use the term by any force necessary to achieve the mission which could even mean deadly force
- Some peacekeeping elements have not moved beyond the older way of thinking
  - Many will claim that they did not sign up for such non-peaceful operations
  - Must think about why they are doing peacekeeping at all if not willing to do what needs to be done to get to / maintain peace
  - May have conflicts when UN says deadly force is acceptable but national laws / regulations do not agree saying that deadly force may be used for only limited reasons

Collaboration involves four phases:

- Communication only
- Cooperation to a limited degree
- Cooperation to a greater degree
- Co-working
The concept of co-working may involve US working with Canada with one side providing trucks for an operation and the other side providing the transport to the area of the operation or different countries in an operation handle different periods of time.

- A key co-working element is that no county can get to a crisis area faster than the US, the UK, or France
  - Sometimes it is most important to get to a crisis early to hold down the situation
  - May need ad hoc cooperation
  - May only need to pounce into the area with a small but capable force to defuse a developing situation
    - Could be just a couple of hundred troops plus enablers (i.e., good comms and helos)
- Both hostile parties often want to make sure that the peacekeepers know they hold nothing against the peacekeepers, only against the other hostile party
  - One side may quickly lay out all the bad things about the other side
- Sometimes the situation can be resolved by landing a capable-looking force at an airport
  - Bring in a few ships along the horizon for added impact
  - Sending a few fast movers overhead at the right time can impress both sides
  - Often only dealing with PWGs – people with guns – may be untrained kids, so rolling in a small professional force create quite an impression
  - Having a mass of helos cross the area of hostility may also have a great psychological impact

Contributors are always looking at situations which might bring them into peacekeeping operations

- A better source would be a central planning capability which could operate at simple / unclassified level
- Technical assistance is needed anywhere that the major Western countries are not present
- Financial assistance is always a major topic and it should be interesting to see how the UN funds African in the near future

Training support

- Most missions could not happen without US training support
- Nine out of 10 peacekeepers now in Africa have been trained by the US
- By 2005 the US had trained 40,000 peacekeepers, 86% of the number were then deployed
  - However, there is no way to measure their effectiveness

Institutions of many types are required including:

- Repositories of what has been learned on past operations
- An increased number of training centers for peacekeepers
- An entity available to quickly disburse peace funds – a reservoir of money that can be expended early in a crisis that might well deflect it
- Planning headquarters – only a small staff would be needed to support all 20 operations
  - The African Union has no capability for planning
  - AU has been given much money but only a handful of people are working that office – a situation which requires patience

Foundational doctrine – something that has not been mentioned until recently

- Must have it for interoperability
- UN directorate of peacekeeping operations has developed a doctrine but it has not been accepted
  - Has not yet been put in front of the entire UN which is run by the non-aligned countries who would most likely have concerns with it over sovereignty and other issues
- Not surprising that the UN has no doctrine yet – compare to the US and its efforts to get a single doctrine among its services over concepts like airpower and joint fire support

In summary, carrying out peacekeeping operations involves

- Three big components – civilian leadership, police presence, and military presence
  - The military often gets dual-hatted to handle tasks it never trained for
- Must walk on foundations of organizations and draft doctrines
  - May need to modify doctrines often
  - Everything else comes from the doctrine decided on especially requirements for training and equipment
- Once all those elements are working, then there must be an institutionalization of what has worked.
QUESTION & ANSWER SESSION

Operationalizing Peacekeeping
- Biggest decision is whether or not it should be funded
- There is no good paradigm for early warning in these situations
  - There are warning centers even within the African Union
  - They don’t work
- It is possible to send people out as monitors into potential trouble areas in a given region
  - Could look for signs like flawed elections
  - Might want to send out teams to prevent problems
  - Success rate so far has been zero
  - One problem is that locals may not want to share information about their situations with outsiders
  - So far these monitoring efforts frequently become nothing more than sumps for money
    - Northern European countries are dumping a great deal into this effort in Africa
    - US is not

The new AFRICOM started in November of 2006 acting as a super-action office
- It did involve the State Dept and other parts of the government
- Within a few months it was established in Stuttgart as an active command
- Still had enormous challenges to overcome
- Prospects
  - Operationally, DoD’s help should enhance diplomatic efforts
  - All involved have been told that they must use soft power and should employ it
  - No training has been given in how to involve these other elements of state authority
- There are coordination and organizational problems, but it may be hard to tell which is the source of a given problem
- Many questions remain about whether organizers understand their mission
  - Will AFRICOM really do what they say they will?
  - Is DoD actually lobbying for any of these new duties?
- DoD often takes on missions because no one else is there to carry them out
  - Mistakes are seen as better than inaction
  - DoD can do many things because its manpower and budget are so large
    - State Dept is still 25% undermanned
    - Can State spare the 12 plus people needed to staff AFRICOM?
    - More State people will be required when the new SOUTHCOM stands up
- AFRICOM should ultimately be helpful for peacekeeping operations

While there is a need to get an intervention force into a crisis area quickly to help stop bloodshed, there are complex problems to consider:
- Frequently, rebels will only tell you what you already know
- As soon as you bring in an intervention force the dynamics of the situation are changed
  - By trying to be responsive, intervention will create an entirely different situation
  - So sending in great numbers of troops immediately may not be the answer
- The countries involved will try to manipulate the intervention forces for their own purposes

Predicting the next hotspot is difficult
- Might look at where there are riots
- Haiti? Egypt?

Once the violence is stopped, then there needs to be an investment in the area to keep it stable
- Otherwise get the situation described by Collier about falling back into hostilities in a few years if peacekeepers don’t stay long enough
- Peacekeeping should get involved early in the peacemaking process
  - Develop some primacy
  - A number of countries (Canada / Japan) are developing offices of reconstruction, etc.
  - The idea is to build up a capacity and to plug it into the crisis at the right time
Problems of commitments
- G-8 and other Western countries agreed in 2004 to train 75,000 peacekeepers in 5 years
  - Not much happening
  - The US has trained 40,000 already and will reach the 75,000 by the deadline
- President may bring up the subject in the next G-8 Summit

Issues of legitimacy
- Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was definitely more organized that the African Union
  - It did have US advisors
  - Controls the African stand-by force which looks like undue US influence to some observers
    - However, it has developed respect in the region
  - ECOWAS is doing what the AU says it would do
  - All of the other efforts are falling very far behind
- The African Union does discuss substantive issue and does makes decisions
  - But it has far to go to make it an active organization for peacekeeping
- ECOWAS still needs tough love efforts from contributors
  - Contributors should say we want to give you money but we need some metrics to show progress

State Department trends
- The Secretary of State has asked for more transformational diplomacy
  - Need more people out handling problems in problem areas
  - Do not need quite as many people in the large embassies with stable relationships
- State is asking Congress for more manpower

The speaker noted that the questions asked during the discussion helped inform him about attitudes on peacekeeping.